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INTRODUCTION
An interesting but difficult problem in copyright law occurs when
an individual holder of a jointly owned copyright decides to license
the copyrighted work without the consent of her co-owners. By and
large, copyright law permits unilateral actions by a single joint owner,
1
despite the potential consequences for other co-owners. One situation, however, has recently caused problems for courts and commentators: when a co-owner unilaterally resolves an act of copyright infringement by a third party by retroactively licensing that infringer,
purportedly authorizing her prior infringement.
Examples of the scenarios that may play out in this situation can
help illustrate the potential problem. Suppose that two individuals, A
2
3
and B, jointly own a copyright in a particular song, X. A third party,
C, wishes to use the copyrighted work, X, in some manner. To that
end, A, B, or both A and B can sell or license their interest in the work
4
to C. Suppose first that A grants C a license to use X in some manner.
Since C has a license in X, B, under copyright law, cannot sue C for
1

See infra text accompanying notes 29-33 (discussing the effects of actions by one
copyright co-owner on other co-owners).
2
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006) (“The authors of a joint work are coowners of
copyright in the work.”).
3
See id. § 102(a) (listing types of works that can be copyrighted).
4
See Meredith v. Smith, 145 F.2d 620, 621 (9th Cir. 1944) (noting that co-owners
of a copyright can grant licenses unilaterally); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.10[A] (2008) (“[A] joint owner may, without obtaining the consent of the other joint owners . . . grant a nonexclusive license to third parties.”).
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copyright infringement: C’s license from only one of the co-owners—
in this case from A alone—is enough to immunize C from claims of
5
infringement.
Now let us suppose, however, that C does not obtain a license
from either A or B before using X, and therefore infringes A and B’s
copyright. A, seeking to enforce her rights in X, threatens C with a
suit for infringement. A and C decide to settle the infringement out
of court, and arrange an agreement, common in the entertainment
industry, whereby A grants C a “retroactive license” that purports to
authorize any prior infringement of the copyright in X on C’s behalf.
Consider what may happen next: B, seeking to enforce her own rights
in X, also threatens C with a suit for infringement. The operative
question in both this example and this Comment is whether C’s retroactive license from A should extinguish B’s ability to sue C for copyright infringement. Only one case at the circuit court level has addressed this question, and various district courts have reached
6
differing but plausible conclusions.
This situation, though, is hardly uncommon. Copyrights are often
jointly owned—particularly (but not exclusively) those in musical
works and motion pictures. Additionally, in the fast-paced entertainment industry, copyrighted works are often exploited before licenses
to use the works are obtained or finalized, as parties often assume that
7
licenses can be acquired after the fact, if necessary.
As this Comment discusses, the absence of a clear rule on whether
unilateral retroactive transfers can cure prior infringements can affect
transactions involving jointly owned copyrights. Indeed, this question
has not only significant legal implications, but also practical importance. Most basically, it raises questions of copyright law regarding coownership, alienability of rights, and copyright’s general goals and
5

See McKay v. CBS Inc., 324 F.2d 762, 763 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[A] license from a coholder of a copyright immunizes the licensee from liability to the other co-holder for
copyright infringement.”); see also Quintanilla v. Tex. Television Inc., 139 F.3d 494, 498
(5th Cir. 1998) (“A co-owner of a copyright cannot be liable to another co-owner for
infringement of the copyright.” (citation omitted)).
6
See infra Part II (discussing cases on retroactive transfers).
7
This is seen quite often in the context of music sampling. See, e.g., Jeffery H.
Brown, Note, “They Don’t Make Music the Way They Used To”: The Legal Implications of
“Sampling” in Contemporary Music, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1941, 1953-54 (noting that record
companies often avoid legal battles with one another over sampling disputes, preferring private prospective arrangements); Note, A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Case for
Fair Pay, 105 HARV. L. REV. 726, 727-28 (1992) (describing, in the sampling context,
the prevalent use of private settlements and presumably retroactive licenses by music
lawyers when prospective sampling licenses were not acquired).
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aims; yet its significance extends further. Since the co-owners of a
jointly held copyright are to be treated generally as tenants in com8
mon, property law may play some role in resolving the issue, though
9
the question of how great a role it ought to play is contested. Furthermore, since the licensing copyright holder can contract away certain rights, there may also be contract law concerns.
Beyond the legal questions there are also practical implications
for those operating in the copyright world. These implications can be
10
seen quite clearly in the context of valuing settlements. As in the example above, if C is not immunized from B’s infringement claims by
virtue of a settlement with A, the value to C of settling with A decreases. If, however, C is immunized from B’s suit, A—aware that its
license is the only license that C needs—can extract a higher price
from C. Or, in the absence of a clear rule on the matter, A may extract a relatively low price, thinking that B would also be able to recover damages or a settlement from C.
While the House Report accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act
states that “[t]here is . . . no need for a specific statutory provision
11
concerning the rights and duties of the coowners of a work,” the
status of unilaterally granted retroactive transfers remains unresolved
in most circuits. Accordingly, this Comment proposes a resolution to
this question: since granting curative power to retroactive licenses will
encourage willful infringement, hamper predictability in copyright
transactions, and fail to protect a copyright co-owner’s vested right to
sue for infringement, unilateral retroactive conveyances should not
provide immunity against infringement suits by other co-owners.
Before elaborating on an answer, however, it is necessary to set
forth some background. To that end, Part I covers general substantive
copyright law as well as the specific rules on joint ownership of copyrights and the general alienability of those rights. Since the cases that
have dealt with the question at issue here provide a valuable glimpse
into the various approaches available to courts in considering this
8

See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5736 (“Under the bill, as under the present law, coowners of a copyright would be
treated generally as tenants in common . . . .”); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4,
§ 6.09 (surveying copyright cases in which courts have analogized to property law).
9
See infra Part III.B (discussing the proper role of property law in resolving this
question).
10
See, e.g., Henry L. Self III, Settlement of Infringement Claims, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 65, 66 (2004) (describing the value to an infringer of being able to settle with only
one co-owner of a jointly held copyright).
11
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5736.
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problem, I discuss those approaches in Part II. I then turn to a discussion of the guiding goals and principles of the Copyright Act and
other areas of law that may help in evaluating the legality and equity
of retroactive transfers in Part III. Lastly, in Part IV I, use these principles to conclude that, while there are strong arguments for allowing
unilateral retroactive transfers, the nonsettling co-owner is so disadvantaged that unilateral retroactive transfers should not be allowed.
I. BACKGROUND: A PRIMER ON SUBSTANTIVE COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Copyrights Generally
A discussion of the basic, functional principles of copyright law
12
can help illuminate the issue at hand.
The protections of artistic
13
and literary works are governed under the Copyright Act of 1976,
the major omnibus copyright legislation that replaced the Copyright
Act of 1909.
Under the Copyright Act, a copyright is a bundle of discrete
14
rights. These rights are held in “original works of authorship fixed
15
in any tangible medium of expression” and include, among other
16
17
rights, the rights to reproduce and distribute the work. These
18
rights are exclusive to the copyright holder or holders. Anyone who
violates those exclusive rights enumerated in section 106 of the Act “is
19
an infringer of the copyright or right of the author.” The “legal or
beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . .
to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right
20
committed while he or she is the owner of it.” This right—the right
21
to sue for infringement—is also exclusive to the copyright owner,

12

For more on the theoretical goals of copyright law, see discussion infra Part
III.A. To be sure, I am only providing the copyright law background necessary to understand the problem of unilateral retroactive transfers.
13
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
14
N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 (2001).
15
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
16
Id. § 106(1).
17
Id. § 106(3). The other rights include the right to prepare derivative works and
the right to perform or display the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), (4)–(6).
18
Id. § 106.
19
Id. § 501(a).
20
Id. § 501(b).
21
See id. (granting copyright owners the right to bring infringement suits); see also
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1991)
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and “it is one of the most valuable ‘sticks’ of the ‘bundle of rights’ of
22
copyright.”
B. Joint Ownership of Copyrights
The doctrine of joint ownership, while not explicitly addressed by
23
the 1909 Copyright Act, was “firmly established by case law” and
24
largely incorporated into the 1976 Copyright Act. The current Act
expressly provides for joint ownership of a copyrightable work: “The
25
authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work.” The
Act defines a “joint work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors
with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable
26
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.” Yet a “joint work” can
27
also result from something more than simple joint authorship.
Copyright co-ownership may, for example, “result from a transfer of
copyright or from the inheritance of a copyright by two or more
28
heirs.”
All joint owners of a copyright share ownership of the work
29
equally, unless a contrary agreement is made.
According to the
House Report accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act, this meant that
joint owners of a copyright each have “an independent right to use o[r]
license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other
(“[T]he Copyright Act does not permit copyright holders to choose third parties to
bring suit on their behalf.”).
22
Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 103 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 (2008);
see also Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing the value of an accrued right to sue for infringement).
23
1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.01 n.1.
24
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5736 (“There is also no need for a specific statutory provision concerning the rights
and duties of the coowners of a work; court-made law on this point is left undisturbed.”).
25
17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
26
Id. § 101.
27
See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.01 (explaining that “joint work” is a
broader concept than “joint authorship”).
28
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965
REVISION BILL 66 (Comm. Print 1965); see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4,
§ 6.01 (noting that a joint work will result from transfers of individual interests or from
being passed through a will or intestacy). Of course, whether a work is coowned is frequently a contested issue. See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 504-09 (2d Cir.
1991) (discussing whether a contributor to a copyrighted work ought to be considered
a coowner of the copyright).
29
1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.08.
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30

coowners for any profits.” Thus, each co-owner has a right to use the
copyrighted work as the Copyright Act provides, including licensing
such uses to a third party, without the consent of the other joint
owner or owners.
The other co-owners, however, are not without protection. First,
the unilaterally licensing co-owner has an “obligation to account to
31
the other joint owner for any profits that are made.” In addition,
one co-owner cannot sell the interests of her other co-owners without
32
their consent or use or authorize a use of the work that would lead
33
to waste.
There is some tension between the notion of the exclusivity of a
copyright holder’s rights and the concept of joint ownership, which
bestows equal rights to use or license the copyrighted work unilater34
ally. The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act sheds some
light on this apparent conflict, identifying two alternative justifications
for joint copyright ownership. The first is a practical consideration:
when each author’s contribution is inseparable and cannot be distinguished from the contributions of the other authors, “the only workable solution is to regard each author as the joint owner of an undi35
vided interest in the entire work.”
This inseparability is the
justification for joint ownership when, for example, two authors write
36
a single novel together. The second occurs when each author’s contributions are independently identifiable, but there is an express or
30

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736
(emphasis added).
31
Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998).
32
See, e.g., Crosney v. Edward Small Prods., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 559, 561 (S.D.N.Y.
1942) (“One cotenant cannot bind the interest of another, although he purports to do
so, ‘in the absence of assent or ratification upon her part.’” (quoting In re Hoffman’s
Estate, 25 N.Y.S.2d 339, 342 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1940))).
33
See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.10[B] (explaining that this rule derives from the area of tangible property, but that this derivation leaves open the question of when intangible property could be said to be destroyed).
34
See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 315 (“The Copyright Act and case law thus
tend to treat ‘joint authorship’ as a deviant form of individual ‘authorship.’ Indeed, in
many particular instances copyright refuses to acknowledge the existence of ‘joint authorship,’ or does so only grudgingly.”).
35
1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.02; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5736 (“[A] work is ‘joint’ if the authors collaborated
with each other . . . .”).
36
See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.02 (“An example of [ joint ownership] is the collaboration of two playwrights whose respective contribution to the final
play are inextricably combined.”).
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implied agreement between the authors that the combined contributions are to form an “indivisible whole,” as in the case of a motion pic37
ture or an opera.
C. The Alienability of Copyrights
A copyright holder can distribute or assign to other parties the
38
rights associated with her copyright. A copyright holder can, for example, grant another party a license to use the work as the owner
might—that is, in any or all of the manners specified in section 106 of
the Copyright Act. The licensee is entitled to use the work with immunity, without being held liable for infringing the copyright because
39
of that use. This immunity, however, is limited to the use specified
by the license; if the licensee uses the work in a manner inconsistent
40
with the license, she can be held liable for copyright infringement.
A license therefore immunizes a user of a copyrighted work from
the threat of being liable for infringement. In the joint-ownership
context, where each co-owner can act unilaterally and independently
41
of her other co-owners, a license from only one of the co-owners is
enough to provide the licensee with immunity from an infringement
42
action brought by another co-owner.

37

See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 120, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5736 (“[A] work is ‘joint’ if . . . each of the authors prepared his or her contribution
with the knowledge and intention that it would be merged with the contributions of
other authors as ‘inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.’”).
38
See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2006); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.11.
39
See Graham v. James, 144 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998) (“A copyright owner who
grants a nonexclusive license to use his copyrighted material waives his right to sue the
licensee for copyright infringement.”); Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck, 110 F.3d 749, 753
(11th Cir. 1997) (holding that implicit in the permission to play a song is the promise
not to sue for infringement); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.04 (noting the
availability of a defense based on a license).
40
See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 10.02.
41
See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
42
See Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 224 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n authorization to the defendant from one joint owner will be an effective defense to an
infringement action brought by another joint owner.” (quoting 1 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 4, § 6.10[A])); McKay v. CBS Inc., 324 F.2d 762, 763 (2d Cir. 1963) (“[A]
license from a co-holder of a copyright immunizes the licensee from liability to the
other co-holder for copyright infringement.”); 5 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:38.50 (2008) (“[A] license from one joint owner precludes suit against the
licensee.”).
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D. Retroactive Conveyances
At issue in this Comment is a problem arising from that undisputed fact that a license from only one of the co-owners is enough to
immunize the licensee from an infringement action brought by another co-owner. The problem at issue here results from the use of after-the-fact conveyances.
There is a certain practice, common in some industries, known as
43
a “retroactive transfer” or “retroactive license.” According to this
practice, a copyright owner conveys the right to use a copyrighted
work as in any ordinary transfer or license, but does so retrospectively.
That is, one party (who does not own any copyright) has already used
the copyrighted work without an owner’s express or implied authorization to do so. The copyright owner, however, in the course of pursuing her rightful remedies, elects not to pursue such an action to
judgment, but rather grants the third-party infringer a license that
purportedly authorizes those past infringements—a retroactive li44
cense. This retroactive license may or may not authorize future uses,
but it claims to give permission to the infringer to use the work in the
past time period in which she did use it. Thus considered, a retroactive license is indeed a legal fiction, and one over which courts and
commentators disagree.
The problem explored in this Comment occurs when the copyright to the work is jointly held and a retroactive license is granted by
43

See 2 PATRY, supra note 42, § 5:111–:112 (describing “after-the-fact transfer” as a
response to unintentionally invalid oral agreements for copyright ownership). While
Patry describes retroactive transfers largely as later written ratifications of prior oral
agreements (as oral agreements are invalid transfers under the Copyright Act, see 17
U.S.C. § 204(a)), my discussion of retroactive transfers is not confined to that context.
I include those transfers that do not even claim to be later ratifications of prior oral
agreements. See generally infra Part II (discussing numerous examples of retroactive
transfers).
44
This right can take the form of a license, or it can be included as part of a release or settlement agreement. While there are significant differences between the two
types of transactions, courts tend to treat the retroactive nature of each type of transaction in the same way, since, in an important sense, many settlements operate as retroactive licenses. See Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325, 329
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[T]he unambiguous language of this [settlement agreement] creates
a retroactive reproduction license that cures any past infringement . . . .”); 2 PATRY,
supra note 42, § 5:112 (“[T]he ability of a copyright owner (or one coowner) to retroactively excuse, through a . . . settlement agreement, infringing activity should be unquestioned, and it is by most courts.”); Self, supra note 10, at 73-74 (suggesting that settlements be regarded as retroactive licenses). But see Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 102
(2d Cir. 2007) (“Licenses and assignments function differently from settlements and
releases . . . .”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 (2008).
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fewer than all of the copyright holders. As discussed above, a license
granted by even one co-owner immunizes the licensee from infringement claims by other co-owners. Yet when this license is retroactive,
more than simple immunization takes place. While the license purports to authorize such a past use, that use was, in fact, not authorized
at the time the third party used the copyrighted work. Thus, the use
45
may well be an act of infringement. If it was an act of infringement,
the thinking goes, each copyright owner should have an individual
right to pursue an action for the act of infringement that the Copy46
right Act provides, seeking, for example, her own proportional dam47
ages arising from that infringement. This right to pursue an action
48
is a right incident to copyright ownership. The infringer’s retroactive license granted by the other co-owner, however, abrogates this
right. This grant, according to some courts and commentators, violates the principle that one co-owner cannot divest her co-owners of
49
their rights.
As a result, some courts have limited a co-owner’s right to grant a
retroactive license to an infringer and have held that a settlement with
or release from one co-owner does not extinguish other co-owners’
copyright infringement claims, while others have not imposed such
limitations on individual copyright owners. The way that courts have
handled this issue and the bases for their rulings are the subject of the
following discussion.
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO RETROACTIVE TRANSFERS
Since this issue has not arisen with great frequency in the case law,
and since the few cases on point have used different approaches and
reached conflicting conclusions, an overview of these rulings is in order. The cases also help demonstrate the practical effects of retroactive conveyances on the parties involved.

45

See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (indicating that the use of the copyrighted work is exclusive
to copyright holders and licensees).
46
See id. § 501(a)–(b).
47
See id. § 504 (providing remedies for infringement).
48
See id. § 501(a)–(b) (defining infringement and providing that “[t]he legal . . .
owner of . . . [a] right under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action for any
infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it”);
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting
the exclusive right of a copyright owner to bring actions for infringement of that
right).
49
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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A. Decisions Finding That Unilateral Retroactive
Transfers Provide Immunization
Unilateral retroactive transfers from one co-owner have immunized an infringer from the claims of other co-owners in at least seven
cases. The first of these cases was SBK Catalogue Partnership v. Orion
50
Pictures Corp., which provided the basis for an influential decision out
of the Southern District of New York, Lone Wolf McQuade Associates v.
51
CBS Inc. The Lone Wolf decision, perhaps because of the importance
of the Southern District of New York in copyright law, became the basis for subsequent decisions. These two decisions and the few cases
that rely on them are discussed below with others that have enforced
the curative power of unilateral retroactive licenses.
1. SBK Catalogue Partnership v. Orion Pictures Corp.
SBK, a 1989 decision by the District of New Jersey, was one of the
first to hold that a unilateral retroactive transfer by one owner of a
jointly held copyright would immunize a third-party user from in52
fringement actions brought by the other joint owners. In SBK, the
copyrighted work at issue was a musical composition entitled “Pepino,
The Italian Mouse,” which was composed by Wandra Merrell and Ray
53
Allen in 1962. Merrell and Allen assigned all rights to “Pepino” to
Romance Music, Inc., who then assigned half of its ownership interest
to Ding Dong Music Corp.; Romance’s fifty-percent stake followed a
chain of assignments until, in 1983, SBK Catalogue Partnership ac54
quired that interest. In 1984, Orion Pictures released the Woody Allen film Broadway Danny Rose containing the musical composition
55
“Agita,” which Merrell and Allen claimed infringed upon “Pepino.”
Merrell and Allen, claiming ownership rights in “Pepino,” filed suit
56
against Orion alleging copyright infringement; SBK Catalogue intervened, also claiming copyright infringement as a fifty-percent holder
57
of the copyright to the work.

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

723 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1989).
961 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
SBK, 723 F. Supp. at 1059, 1072.
Id. at 1056-57.
Id. at 1057.
Id.
Id. at 1058.
Id. at 1058-59.
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After protracted settlement negotiations, SBK Catalogue and
58
Orion reached a settlement agreement. “The agreement,” the court
noted, “contemplated a retroactive written license for the use of the
musical composition ‘Pepino,’” and prompted Orion, based upon on
its newly acquired license, to move for summary judgment against
59
Merrell and Allen, which the court granted.
While this specific
summary judgment order was the subject of an unpublished decision,
the court confirmed the preclusive effect of its previous finding that
SBK Catalogue “was entirely within its rights to grant a retroactive li60
cense to the Orion defendants.” Without extensive discussion, the
court noted that SBK Catalogue’s license to Orion, despite being
granted retroactively, was sufficient, and held that that “authorization
. . . is an effective defense to an infringement action brought by an61
other joint owner.”
2. Lone Wolf McQuade Associates v. CBS Inc.
The Southern District of New York, relying on SBK, held in Lone
Wolf McQuade Associates v. CBS Inc. that a unilateral “retroactive license
62
can cure past infringements.”
The plaintiff brought an action
against CBS alleging that CBS’s popular television series, “Walker
Texas Ranger,” violated the plaintiff’s copyrights in their movie, Lone
63
Wolf McQuade, both of which starred the actor Chuck Norris.
Well before the litigation began, Orion Pictures Corp. purchased
most of the rights to and interests in Lone Wolf McQuade, and, in 1982,
conveyed “all right, title and interest in and to all copyrights in the
Film” to Lone Wolf McQuade Associates, “but expressly did not convey and reserved various rights including ‘any interest whatsoever in
64
and to . . . any television series rights . . . .’” Orion and CBS later discussed various television spinoffs of the Lone Wolf McQuade film, but
could not reach an agreement before CBS aired “Walker, Texas
65
Ranger.”
After Lone Wolf McQuade Associates filed suit against

58

Id. at 1059.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
961 F. Supp. 587, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
63
Id. at 590-91.
64
Id. at 591 (quoting purchase agreement between Orion and Lone Wolf
McQuade Associates).
65
Id.
59
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CBS, Orion intervened in the action, alleging that CBS infringed its
66
rights to the copyright in Lone Wolf McQuade.
Orion eventually settled its copyright infringement claim with CBS
in a 1996 settlement agreement, which included a retroactive license
for CBS to use Lone Wolf McQuade in connection with its “Walker
67
Texas Ranger” series. CBS then sought to use this retroactive license
as a defense to Lone Wolf McQuade Associates’ copyright infringe68
ment claim. The court, citing SBK, held that “a retroactive license
can cure past infringements,” despite the plaintiff’s argument “that
Orion’s retroactive license in favor of CBS does not cure any infringement that occurred prior to the date of the grant of the li69
cense.” The Lone Wolf court, like the SBK court, did not engage in
an extended analysis.
3. Johnson v. Tuff-N-Rumble Management, Inc.
Relying exclusively on the Lone Wolf decision, the Eastern District
of Louisiana in Johnson v. Tuff-N-Rumble Management, Inc. held that a
retroactive license granted unilaterally by a single co-owner cured
70
prior infringement. The retroactive license in this case, granted to
certain defendants as part of a settlement agreement (as in Lone Wolf
and SBK), “effectively ended all plaintiffs’ claims against the . . . defendants because these defendants as licensees could not infringe
71
upon the song’s copyright.”
4. Silberstein v. Fox Entertainment Group
A later case in the Southern District of New York also relied exclusively upon the Lone Wolf decision. In Silberstein v. Fox Entertainment
Group, Inc., the plaintiff had used an animated character in various
publicity campaigns; she soon discovered that the Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corporation (Fox) was using a similar animated character in
a forthcoming motion picture, Ice Age, and initiated suit against Fox to
72
enjoin it from using the allegedly infringing character. During the
66

Id. at 590-91.
Id. at 590.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 597-98.
70
No. 99-1374, 2000 WL 1808486, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 8, 2000), appeal dismissed,
253 F.3d 701 (5th Cir. 2001).
71
Id.
72
424 F. Supp. 2d 616, 620-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
67
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course of litigation, it was discovered that the plaintiff’s character itself was a copy of a copyrighted character jointly owned by a clip-art
73
company and its artist. The plaintiff then purchased from the clip74
art artist the rights to the character, retroactive to its creation. Fox,
seeking to escape any chance of liability to the plaintiff, negotiated for
and purchased a nonexclusive license to the character from the clip75
art company, also retroactive to the date of the character’s creation.
The court, noting that a license from one co-owner is a defense to infringement actions by another co-owner, dismissed the plaintiff’s
76
claims.
The court held that “[t]he retroactivity of the licensing
agreement between [copyright co-owner] DAS and Fox has no necessary effect on its power to immunize Fox against claims of infringe77
ment of the [original] copyright.” The court gave no further explanation for its decision granting immunizing power to the retroactive
license.
5. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC
The court that decided Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films
78
LLC did not rely on either SBK or Lone Wolf. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s copyright in the
musical composition “100 Miles and Running” in the defendant’s
79
1998 film, I Got the Hook Up. The defendant asserted two alternative
defenses: first, that it received an oral license from the original coowners of “100 Miles” in 1998—prior to the plaintiff’s acquisition of
any ownership interest—and second, that it received a written license
from the original co-owners in 2002 retroactive to the date of in80
fringement, and, either way, it ought to be immune from suit. The
81
plaintiff argued that Leicester v. Warner Bros. —discussed below—
82
which the plaintiff read to bar retroactive licenses, should control.

73

Id. at 622.
Id. at 622-23.
75
Id. at 623.
76
Id. at 629.
77
Id.
78
230 F. Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 383 F.3d 390 (6th
Cir. 2004), modified, 401 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2004).
79
Id. at 833.
80
Id. at 835-36.
81
No. 95-4058, 1998 WL 34016724 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 1998), aff’d on other grounds,
232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000).
82
Bridgeport Music, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 836-37.
74
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The court found the defendant’s first defense persuasive and held
that the defendant did receive an oral license from at least one of the
83
song’s co-owners.
In analyzing the alternative defense, the court
viewed the 2002 retroactive license as a memorialization of the earlier
oral license, distinguishing it from Leicester and from standard retroac84
tive licenses.
6. MP3.com Litigation
Extensive litigation relating to the MP3.com website prompted the
Southern District of New York to rule again on a retroactive license.
The defendant, MP3.com, “purchased tens of thousands of popular
CDs in which plaintiffs held the copyrights, and, without authorization, copied their recordings onto its computer servers so as to be able
to replay the recordings for its subscribers”—a “clear” act of infringe85
MP3.com settled with
ment in the opinion of the district court.
some of the copyright holders, including the Harry Fox Agency
(HFA), “a licensing and collection agency for music publishers,”
86
which allegedly co-owned some of the works at issue. The court held
that “the unambiguous language of this release creates a retroactive
reproduction license that cures any past infringement by MP3.com of
87
these works.” Unlike previous cases, the court explicitly noted that it
88
was construing the release agreement as a retroactive license, citing a
Sixth Circuit case for the proposition that “a release can, in certain
89
circumstances, have the effect of and be construed as a license,” despite “the absence of the word ‘license’” from the settlement’s lan-

83

See id. at 835 (“[T]he Court finds that the defendant obtained a valid oral license from at least one of the original owners for use of ‘100 Miles’ prior to Bridgeport
obtaining any ownership interest in the song.”).
84
Id. at 835-36.
85
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
86
Copyright.Net Music Publ’g LLC v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 01-7321, 2003 WL
740757, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2003).
87
Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325, 329 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). The release provided in pertinent part: “HFA, for and on behalf of the Settling
HFA-Releasors, further agrees that any Copyrighted Works owned or controlled by the
HFA-Releasors which were previously copied by MP3.com in connection with its
My.MP3.com service shall be deemed to have been copied with each of the HFAReleasor’s respective consent.” Id.
88
Copyright.Net, 2003 WL 740757, at *1.
89
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 482 F.2d 317, 320 (6th Cir.
1973).
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90

guage. Thus, the court found that the retroactive licenses granted as
part of the settlement agreement provided defenses against HFA’s co91
owners’ infringement claims.
7. Venegas-Hernandez v. Peer
92

The District of Puerto Rico, in Venegas-Hernandez v. Peer, recently
relied on Lone Wolf and SBK to uphold a unilateral retroactive transfer. More importantly, however, this case presents an interesting scenario that makes the fictional quality of a retroactive transfer apparent. In Venegas-Hernandez, the plaintiffs, heirs of a Puerto Rican
composer, inherited joint ownership in their father’s musical works
and alleged that numerous defendants had infringed their copy93
rights. While this case is peppered with grants of retroactive licenses,
one defendant (who allegedly infringed the copyright in 1993)
claimed that a codefendant and former joint owner of the copyrights
to a work at issue, the Latin American Music Company (LAMCO), had
94
granted it a license to use the work in 1998, retroactive to 1993.
Plaintiffs argued that LAMCO did not actually own the rights to the
work in 1993, when the other defendant allegedly infringed their
95
copyright. The district court noted that because retroactive licenses
96
protect an infringer from suits based on past infringement, “[t]he
granting of a retroactive license implies that the retroactive licensor
had the requisite ownership and, therefore, authority to make such a
97
grant at the time the infringement occurred.” The court found that
since LAMCO did not own the rights to the work at the past time to
which the retroactive transfer extended, LAMCO, through its retroactive transfer, was liable as a contributory infringer (for causing its ret-

90

Country Rd. Music, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
Id. at 329-30; Copyright.Net, 2003 WL 740757, at *1-2.
92
No. 01-1215, 2004 WL 3686337, at *33 (D.P.R. May 19, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d
on other grounds sub nom. Venegas-Hernández v. Asociación de Compositores y Editores
de Música Latinoamericana (ACEMLA), 424 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2005).
93
Venegas-Hernandez, 2004 WL 3686337, at *1-2.
94
Id. at *33.
95
Id.
96
Id. (citing Lone Wolf McQuade Assoc. v. CBS Inc., 961 F. Supp. 587, 596
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); SBK Catalogue P’ship v. Orion Pictures Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1053,
1059 (D.N.J. 1989)).
97
Id.
91
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98

roactive licensee to infringe). The court then awarded the plaintiffs
99
LAMCO’s profits from the retroactive transfer.
On appeal, the First Circuit noted that “obviously a license
100
[granted] in 1998 did not ‘cause’ a 1993 infringement.”
Yet the
court did not have a chance either to opine on the use of retroactive
transfers or to overrule the district court’s ruling, since LAMCO did
“not pursue this interesting point, relying instead on a statute of limi101
tations argument.”
The court also noted that “the discussion in the
briefs is too sparse to justify any serious attempt to develop principles
102
in this recherché area of copyright law.”
B. Decisions Finding That Unilateral Retroactive
Transfers Do Not Provide Immunization
There is another line of cases, which, unlike SBK, Lone Wolf, and
their progeny, does not allow unilateral retroactive transfers to cure
103
past infringement.
Also unlike SBK and Lone Wolf, the courts in
these cases did not reach their conclusions by relying on any specific
precedent but instead tended to make somewhat vague (with the exception of Davis v. Blige) policy arguments.
1. David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc.
The plaintiffs in David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., were
members of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) who alleged that the defendant infringed their copy104
rights in musical works by broadcasting them without authorization.
The defendant was licensed by ASCAP to broadcast the works in question until 1980; following the expiration of that license, the defendant

98

Id.
Id. at *34.
100
Venegas-Hernández v. Asociación de Compositores y Editores de Música Latinoamericana (ACEMLA), 424 F.3d 50, 60 (1st Cir. 2005).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Some, however, have interpreted the cases discussed in this section (with the
exception of Davis v. Blige) as not necessarily ruling on the curative power of unilateral
retroactive licenses. See 2 PATRY, supra note 42, § 5:112 n.3 (distinguishing Leicester v.
Warner Bros., No. 95-4058, 1998 WL 34016724, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 1998), aff’d on
other grounds, 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000), and David v. Showtime/The Movie
Chanel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 753-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), from cases concerning retroactive licenses because they involved nonexclusive licenses).
104
697 F. Supp. 752, 753-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
99
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could forgo negotiating a new license and instead apply to ASCAP for
a license pursuant to a consent decree between ASCAP and the Department of Justice. When the defendant’s license expired, it chose to
negotiate to renew the licensing agreements, instead of applying un105
der the consent decree.
The defendant continued to broadcast the
songs, without a finalized license, while undergoing negotiations.
When negotiations failed, the defendant applied to ASCAP for a li106
cense retroactive to the date of the old license’s expiration.
Plain107
tiffs sued for infringement.
The Southern District of New York held that the defendant’s application for a retroactive license did not bar the plaintiffs’ infringement claims. The court explained that “recognition of the subsequent filing of an application for a ‘retroactive’ license as a defense
for prior infringing conduct would eviscerate the protections inherent
108
in the copyright scheme.”
The court did not elaborate on which
protections would be eviscerated or how this might occur.
2. Leicester v. Warner Bros.
In Leicester v. Warner Bros., plaintiff, an artist, was employed by a
real estate developer to create sculptural elements for the developer’s
109
Los Angeles building.
The rights to the sculptural design were coowned by the plaintiff and, as the district court concluded, the archi110
tect. In 1994, the developer, without contacting the architect or the
plaintiff, allowed Warner Brothers to make replicas and use depictions
of the developer’s property in connection with the film Batman For111
ever.
In 1995, the plaintiff sued Warner Brothers for copyright infringement. The Central District of California ruled that since the developer was granted a nonexclusive license to reproduce the work, it
112
could not sublicense that right to Warner Brothers.

105

Id. at 754 & n.1.
Id. at 754-55.
107
Id. at 755.
108
Id. at 764.
109
No. 95-4058, 1998 WL 34016724, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 1998), aff’d on other
grounds, 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000).
110
Id. at *4.
111
Id. at *2.
112
Id. at *3 (“[T]he grant of the license may not be assigned or sublicensed by the
licensee unless the grant of the license is exclusive.” (citing 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 4, § 10.01[C][4])).
106

2009]

Unilateral Settlements and Retroactive Transfers

899

As a defense, Warner Brothers argued that it had received a license to use and sublicense the work. During the course of this litigation, and after the plaintiff had brought suit, the architect granted a
retroactive license to the developer, which had an explicit provision
permitting sublicensing. The court invalidated this retroactive sublicensing provision and rejected Warner Brothers’ argument, finding
that since the architect was a co-owner of the copyright, he could only
grant a nonexclusive license, which could not have a sublicensing pro113
vision.
The court briefly noted another reason (more relevant for
our purposes) for rejecting the retroactive license defense:
At the time Warner Bros. took the pictures and made pictorial reproductions of [the work], it had no license to do so. It’s [sic] actions at that
time, if an infringement of Mr. Leicester’s copyright, could not be later
validated by the grant of the license. . . . The court rejects the idea that
the earlier infringement can be retroactively validated by the later grant
114
of the license.

3. Encore Entertainment, LLC v. KIDdesigns, Inc.
In this “labyrinthine” copyright infringement case, the defendant
argued that its alleged infringements were “cured” because it received
115
a retroactive license that covered its allegedly infringing activities.
Acknowledging that no federal circuit court had addressed the issue
of whether retroactive licenses could cure prior infringements, the
court noted the differing conclusions of the Leicester and Showtime
courts on the one hand and the Lone Wolf and SBK courts on the
116
other.
The court concluded that Leicester and Showtime were more
117
persuasive. In support of its conclusion, the court
note[d] that, to find otherwise, would promote a scenario whereby individuals would be permitted, if not encouraged, to willingly infringe upon
a copyright interest until caught and then, once caught, simply apply for
a retroactive license to avoid liability for earlier infringement. Such a

113

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
115
Encore Entm’t, LLC v. KIDdesigns, Inc., No. 3:03-1129, 2005 WL 2249897, at
*1, *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2005).
116
Id. at *10.
117
Id. Some find the court’s reliance on the first two cases to be misplaced. See,
e.g., 2 PATRY, supra note 42, § 5:112 n.3 (“Neither case supports Encore Entmt’s position.”).
114
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scheme would plainly contradict the purposes underlying federal copy118
right law.

The court did not elaborate on its holding beyond this statement.
4. Davis v. Blige
In 2007, the Second Circuit attempted to answer the question at
issue in this Comment, calling into doubt the precedential value of
Lone Wolf, Silberstein, and the MP3.com litigation. The decision, Davis
v. Blige, is the first appellate judgment to pick up where the VenegasHernandez court left off and rule on whether a retroactive license from
119
one co-owner immunizes an infringer from suits by other co-owners.
In Davis, the circuit court reversed the district court and held that a
license could only act prospectively and could not cure past infringe120
ment.
In Davis, plaintiff Sharice Davis sued Mary J. Blige and others in
December 2003, claiming that two songs on Blige’s 2001 album in121
fringed Davis’s copyrights in two other songs.
Davis claimed that
the songs were written by her and Bruce Chambliss, but Davis was not
given songwriting credit on the album, which listed the authors as
Blige (Chambliss’s stepdaughter), Bruce Miller (Chambliss’s son),
122
and others. Chambliss, who was not a party to the suit, claimed that
he had granted Miller rights in the songs in an oral transfer around
123
On the day before Chambliss
the time of the songs’ composition.
(who was not a party in the action) was to be first deposed, Chambliss
and Miller signed a written transfer agreement, which purported to
transfer to Miller all interests in the songs and all rights “past, present,
and future . . . effective as of the date [Chambliss] first create[d] the
124
above-referenced Composition.” The defendants claimed that these
written agreements merely ratified their earlier oral transfers, or, in
the alternative, that the written agreements themselves retroactively

118

Encore Entm’t, 2005 WL 2249897, at *10.
Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]here is no appellate case law
on the issue of retroactive assignment of copyright . . . .”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117
(2008).
120
Id. at 102-04.
121
Id. at 94.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 95.
124
Id. at 96 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting the transfer
agreement).
119
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125

granted Miller ownership of the works.
Since Miller was an owner
of the work, the defendants claimed, neither he nor anyone to whom
he licensed the works (i.e., Blige and the other defendants) could in126
fringe the works.
The district court ruled that regardless of the existence of any
prior oral transfer,
[w]here there is no dispute between transferor and transferee of a copyright as to the validity of the transfer, such a transfer has been consistently upheld. This is the case even where the license or transfer takes
place after the institution of an action for copyright infringement, and
indeed, even where the plaintiff in the action is the other co-owner of
the copyright and the retroactive license or transfer by one co-owner
127
serves to bar the infringement claim of the other co-owner.

The district court found the circumstances in David v. Showtime/The
Movie Channel to be distinguishable and understood the Leicester
court’s finding arguably barring retroactive transfers to be both a
mere ancillary ground for its final holding and “contrary to the great
128
weight of authority.”
The district court concluded that the retroac129
tive transfer barred the infringement claims.
The Second Circuit reversed the district court, finding that allowing one co-owner to cure the past infringements of a third party extinguished the nonparty co-owner’s valuable right to sue for infringe130
ment—a right that accrues at the time of the infringement.
A coowner, the court held, could herself grant a retroactive license and
thus bar her own infringement claims, but could not eradicate the
131
claims of her co-owners.
Thus, a retroactive license from one coowner would not immunize an infringer from suits by other co-owners.
125

Id. at 95-97.
Id. at 96-97.
127
Davis v. Blige, 419 F. Supp. 2d 493, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d on other grounds,
505 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 (2008). The district court cited
favorably Lone Wolf, Silberstein, the MP3.com litigation, and Tuff-N-Rumble Mgmt.
128
Id. at 500, 501 n.4 (asserting that Showtime was distinguishable because it involved defendants who were seeking to obtain a retroactive license and that the argument in Leicester against retroactive application was unconvincing).
129
Id. at 499-501 (holding that “there exists no genuine issue as to the intent of coauthor Chambliss to transfer his rights to Miller” and in such a case lower courts agree
that the transfer bars an infringement claim).
130
Davis, 505 F.3d at 103-04.
131
See id. at 104 (“We have no doubt that Chambliss can release his own accrued
claims of copyright infringement against Miller and his fellow defendants, either orally
or in writing. But we know of no authority to sanction his attempt to release any rights
Davis has against Miller, for they are not Chambliss’s to release.”).
126
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In reversing, the Second Circuit also distinguished the case at
hand from the Lone Wolf line of cases that related to settlements, not
132
licenses alone, as in Davis.
The court held that licenses could only
133
be prospective, and that only releases could cure prior infringement.
Yet despite this distinction, the court not only ruled on retroactive licenses, but also took occasion to announce that “[a] settlement
agreement can only waive or extinguish claims held by a settling
owner; it can have no effect on co-owners who are not parties to the
134
settlement agreement.”
Thus, a release of infringement claims
would need to come from each individual co-owner.
The Second Circuit found support for its conclusions in the prin135
ciples of copyright, contract, tort, property, and patent law.
While
the principles the court found relevant and the propriety of their application have been questioned, as discussed below, the court did believe that its decision would discourage infringement and increase
certainty and predictability, such that it would be clear whether a par136
ticular exploitation of a work was authorized.
The Davis decision has been criticized in the entertainment industry, where retroactive transfers are common. The Recording Industry
137
Association of America and the Motion Picture Association of Amer138
ica have both filed petitions for rehearing as amici curiae, and
Google’s senior copyright counsel, copyright scholar William Patry,
has called the decision “a disaster of major proportions” that “reflects
139
a stunning deafness to the commercial realities of life.”

132

Id. at 102.
Id. at 104.
134
Id. at 102.
135
See, e.g., id. at 97-98 (“Although the Copyright Act itself is silent on the issue of
retroactive transfer or license, we conclude that such retroactive transfers violate basic
principles of tort and contract law, and undermine the policies embodied by the Copyright Act.”).
136
Id. at 104-06.
137
The Recording Industry Association of America is a trade group representing
the U.S. recording industry, including record labels and distributors who create,
manufacture, and/or distribute approximately ninety percent of the sound recordings
produced and sold in the United States. Recording Industry Association of America,
Who We Are, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
138
The Motion Picture Association of America is a trade group representing the
motion-picture, home-video, and television industries, including producers and distributors. Motion Picture Association of America, About Us, http://www.mpaa.org/
AboutUs.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
139
Posting of William Patry to The Patry Copyright Blog, The Second Circuit Goes
to the Dark Side, http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2007/10/second-circuit-goes-to133
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III. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
As described above, courts have undertaken various analyses and
reached different conclusions regarding retroactive transfers. Thus,
an analysis of the potentially relevant legal principles can help identify
possible solutions to the problems of retroactive transfers.
A. The Goals of the Copyright Act and Copyright Law Considerations
Most of the courts that have limited the ability of retroactive transfers to cure infringement did so at least in part because they believed
that retroactive transfers threatened the purposes of the Copyright
140
Act.
But these courts have also overwhelmingly failed to indicate
which particular purposes of the Act need protection. Since any resolution of this problem should align with these purposes, it is fitting to
attempt to articulate them here.
Copyright regulation falls within the federal government’s ambit
141
by virtue of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, and Congress
has enacted copyright protection schemes since the Founding. An
explicit goal enumerated in the first copyright act, in line with the
142
Copyright Clause, was to encourage learning.
While no explicit di143
rection is given on how to encourage learning, clear views on how to
do so were expressed in the legislative history. A committee established by the Continental Congress, empowered to investigate how

dark-side.html (Oct. 8, 2007, 9:00 EST) (arguing that the Second Circuit failed “to understand the statute”).
140
See, e.g., Davis, 505 F.3d at 105 (stating that to uphold a defense of retroactive
transfer would be “contrary to the intent of Congress in enacting the Copyright Act of
1976”); Encore Entm’t, LLC v. KIDdesigns, Inc., No. 03-1129, 2005 WL 2249897, at *10
(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2005) (“Such a scheme would plainly contradict the purposes
underlying federal copyright law.”); David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697
F. Supp. 752, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that retroactive license defenses “would eviscerate the protections inherent in the copyright scheme”).
141
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
142
See Act of May 31, 1790, 1st Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed
1802) (characterizing the act in the preamble as “[a]n Act for the encouragement of
learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned”). This language is identical to Great Britain’s first copyright act, known as the Statute of Anne. See Copyright
Act 1709, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19.
143
William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 910-11 (1997).
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best to promote “genius” and the “useful arts,” concluded that
“nothing is more properly a man’s own than the fruit of his study, and
that the protection and security of literary property would greatly tend
to encourage genius.” Accordingly, the committee recommended to
the states that they provide authors and publishers “exclusive right[s]”
145
to their work.
The goals of copyright were thus (1) to grant the
creator of a work the rights to the product of his efforts, and (2) to
encourage, by such a grant, the development of new works that would
promote the public good.
These goals have remained conceptually constant through the
present, though the former has taken on a decidedly secondary—
146
albeit enabling—role.
In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that
the purpose of copyright protection is “to motivate the creative activity
of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to
allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited
147
period of exclusive control has expired.” In so remarking, the court
noted that “[t]he monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize
are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special pri148
vate benefit.”
Accordingly, any scheme regarding retroactive transfers ought not to provide simply a reward to a co-owner of a copyright
without encouraging the “ultimate aim” of benefitting the public.
To be sure, the profit-making power of a co-owner or creator of a
copyrighted work cannot be underestimated when considering what
149
would be best for the public good.
In furtherance of these goals,
144

24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 180 (1783). This committee, as
it were, included James Madison. Id. at 326.
145
Id. at 326-27. This is the essential Lockean justification for copyright. See, e.g.,
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 305 (1988) (“The
‘labor-desert’ theory asserts that labor often creates social value, and it is this production of social value that ‘deserves’ reward, not the labor that produced it.”).
146
The Supreme Court has noted:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (footnote omitted),
superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
147
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
148
Id.
149
See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(“[C]opyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit
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Congress, through the Copyright Act, has given copyright holders a
monopoly over the rights to their works. This monopoly takes the
form of the rights granted to a copyright holder listed in sections 106
150
to 122 of the Act.
These rights are exclusive to the copyright
151
holder.
In order to keep these rights exclusive and deter others
from violating this monopoly (and therefore making the creation less
valuable to the copyright holder), the Act provides that copyright
holders can be awarded damages for infringement as well as any actual profits received by an infringer, or alternatively, potentially con152
siderable statutory damages. In line with these broad goals of deterring infringement and protecting the copyright holder’s monopoly,
Congress intended that these damages “compensate the copyright
owner for losses from the infringement, and . . . prevent the infringer
153
from unfairly benefiting from a wrongful act.”
In addition, Congress, through the remedies provided for in the
Copyright Act, has expressed a stronger distaste for willful infringement than for infringements that the copyright holder cannot prove
154
155
were willful.
And while the Act still wishes to deter even innocent
156
infringers, it does so with a considerably lower penalty.
This aversion to specifically willful infringement must also be accounted for
when considering retroactive transfers.

from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in
the proliferation of knowledge. . . . The profit motive is the engine that ensures the
progress of science.”), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
150
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–122 (2006) (delineating the exclusive rights of copyright
holders, their scope, and their limitations); see also supra Part II.
151
See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
152
See id. § 504(b)–(c) (providing the copyright holder a choice between actual
and statutory damages).
153
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5777.
154
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (providing for a maximum statutory damage
award of $150,000 where the court finds the infringement to be willful), with id.
§ 504(c)(1) (providing for a maximum statutory damage award of $30,000 in the case
of a nonwillful infringement).
155
An innocent infringer is one who proves that he or she “was not aware and had
no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright.” 17
U.S.C. § 504(c)(2); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 163, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5779.
156
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (providing for a discretionary reduction of the statutory damage award to $200); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 163, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5779 (noting that the innocent infringer provision “is sufficient to protect against unwarranted liability in cases of occasional or isolated innocent infringement,” and, “by establishing a realistic floor for liability, the provision preserves its intended deterrent effect”).
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Yet discouraging infringement presents only part of the copyright
story. Understanding that achieving the optimal public good requires
that copyrighted works be exposed and actually reach the public, the
Act also encourages behavior beyond the monopoly provisions. The
157
Act provides, for example, for a fair use exception.
As a whole, the
Act and recent copyright case law both attempt to encourage the licensing or distribution and dissemination of copyrighted works so
158
that the public can benefit from them.
The introduction of “divisibility” of the rights to a copyrighted
work in the 1976 Act revisions has been a primary encouragement towards that end. Under the 1909 Act, the copyright owner had to own
all the rights associated with the copyright and could not divide them.
Furthermore, only a copyright proprietor could bring an infringe159
ment action.
Both of these limitations discouraged licensing by
making it significantly less valuable; exclusive licensees, for example,
could not enforce their rights unless complete ownership of the copyright had been transferred. Moreover, copyright owners, knowing
that they had to convey either all or nothing, tended to give nothing
away. Authors, their representatives, and others routinely criticized
160
this practice.
Under amendments made in the 1976 Act, however,
divisibility became an important feature of copyright law, as “[t]he
161
ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part”
and “[a]ny of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright . . . may be
162
transferred . . . and owned separately.”
In addition, exclusive licensees of a particular right became “entitled, to the extent of that right,
to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner

157

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[U]se of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1613 (1982) (arguing that in many cases where “market flaws might preclude
achievement of desirable consensual exchanges,” courts have excused infringing conduct as fair).
158
See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985) (“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright
supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.” (emphasis added)).
159
See, e.g., Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 25(b) (repealed 1976).
160
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 123, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5738-39
(noting that the provision in the 1976 Act allowing for divisibility had “long been
sought by authors and their representatives, and . . . attracted wide support from other
groups”).
161
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1).
162
Id. § 201(d)(2).
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163

by this title.”
Any view on retroactive transfers certainly should not
lose sight of the congressional goal evinced in these amendments:
making licenses both more valuable and more willfully exchanged.
B. Property Law
Since copyright law also relies on property law to some extent, and
since courts—such as the Davis v. Blige court—found it relevant to
look to general property law concepts in ruling on the curative powers
164
of retroactive transfers, it would be helpful to review relevant realproperty laws. In addition, we should be mindful of the extent to
which these property laws should supplement or supplant copyright
165
law.
Copyright law has an explicit connection to property law through
the legislative history of the Copyright Act. The House Report to the
1976 Act indicates that “[u]nder the bill, as under the [1909 Act, as
amended], coowners of a copyright would be treated generally as ten166
ants in common.” Yet this simple indication that the two are related
167
is, at best, puzzling.
There are, however, a number of clear areas of
copyright law where the influence of tenancy in common is clear:
168
joint owners each have equal and undivided rights to use the work;
joint owners can convey or lease any undivided interest unilaterally;
joint owners also do not possess the right of survivorship in a fellow
169
joint owner’s interest in the work; and joint owners have a right to
170
an accounting from all profits from the work.

163
164

Id.
Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117

(2008).
165

Not all were comfortable with the Davis court’s introduction of New York state
property law concepts under the circumstances. See Posting of William Patry to The
Patry Copyright Blog, supra note 139 (criticizing the Davis court for applying “venerable” state law property concepts instead of copyright law).
166
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
167
See Avner D. Sofer, Joint Authorship: An Uncomfortable Fit with Tenancy in Common,
19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1998) (noting that Congress has not explained precisely
how joint authors are to be legally treated as tenants in common, and that, thus far,
courts have avoided addressing the legal issues of categorizing joint authors as tenants
in common).
168
17 U.S.C. §201(a) (2006); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.08. Tenants
in common are also said to hold separate and undivided shares of the whole estate.
169
1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.09.
170
Id. § 6.12[A].
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Two particular “venerable” property law principles are especially
relevant here. The first is that, “while an owner may convey any of his
rights to others permanently or temporarily, he may not convey more
171
than he owns.”
The second is that, while one cotenant can settle
her own interest in property, she cannot settle the interests of her cotenants; if she settles before the action, the other cotenants can still
172
sue.
It is important to note, however, that unlike in copyright proceedings now, cotenants traditionally had to join their cotenants when
173
bringing an action, though they could afterwards settle individually.
Applying this principle, the Davis court noted that while a cotenant can freely alienate her interest in the co-owned property, she cannot harm the rights of her cotenants by binding them to “an agree174
ment concerning the use, control, or title to the joint property.”
This notion seems to be crucial to the Davis court’s theory: understanding that the right to sue for infringement is a co-owner’s right,
the court viewed another co-owner’s power to extinguish that right
through a retroactive license or settlement as contrary to that very
principle.
C. Contract Law
Contract law may play a role in this situation for several reasons.
First, courts have often looked to contract law when resolving many
175
issues of joint ownership.
Second, any retroactive license, whether
part of a settlement or not, is essentially a contract and purports to
give parties certain rights; thus, even a cursory contract analysis could
be beneficial. As such, the Davis court, for example, sought to estab-

171

Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 (2008).
See Jackson v. Moore, 87 N.Y.S. 1101, 1103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904) (“One tenant
in common can settle for or release his interest in such personal property, but he cannot settle for or release the interest of his co-tenants. If one tenant in common should
settle for his portion of the damages before action, the other may sue without joining
him.”).
173
See Hill v. Gibbs, 5 Hill 56, 56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (“As a general rule, tenants
in common must join in bringing personal actions in which all are interested.”); Jackson, 87 N.Y.S at 1103 (citing Hill, 5 Hill at 56).
174
Davis, 505 F.3d at 102 (quoting Wagman v. Carmel, 601 F. Supp. 1012, 1015
(E.D. Pa. 1985)).
175
See Sofer, supra note 167, at 2-3 (noting that courts have traditionally avoided
the issue of joint authors as cotenants, and have instead relied on the “more bright-line
law of contracts”).
172
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lish whether retroactive licenses were consistent with contract law
176
principles.
It is important to understand the contract issues at play. The basic
contract law principle implicated by retroactive conveyances is that a
177
contract cannot bind one who is not a party to it.
This principle
applies as follows: retroactive transfers are contracts that eliminate
any cause of action for infringement that the licensing co-owner may
have had. In addition, however, such a license would also eliminate
the causes of action of other co-owners who were not party to the license. The Davis court, for example, found that this would effectively
bind co-owners to the settlement or licensing agreement into which
178
the settling or licensing co-owner had entered.
As I will discuss below, it is not clear how much influence contract
principles should have under these copyright circumstances. Nevertheless, because of the obvious ability of one co-owner to affect the interests of another co-owner without the latter’s participation in the licensing contract, this principle is relevant.
D. Analogizing to Patent Law
Where copyright law is ambiguous or contested, courts have often
179
looked to relevant patent law for support, as patent and copyright
180
181
have a “historic kinship” and much in common.
Both patent and
copyright law, for example, give joint owners equal rights to use the
182
work or patented invention without the consent of other co-owners.
176

See Davis, 505 F.3d at 103 (“Accordingly, we must examine carefully whether
retroactive licenses and assignments that extinguish a co-owner’s accrued right to sue
are consistent with the general principles of . . . contract law that underlie the accrual
and settlement of infringement claims.”).
177
See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) (“It goes without
saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty.”).
178
Davis, 505 F.3d at 103.
179
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439-40
(1984) (finding support for vicarious copyright infringement in patent law).
180
Id. at 439.
181
Both are forms of intellectual property, and both arise from the same constitutional clause.
182
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006) (granting joint owners of a copyright the
right to exercise their rights independently), with 35 U.S.C. § 262 (2006) (granting the
same freedom of exercise to joint owners of a patent). A leading copyright case from
the nineteenth century relied not only on tenancy-in-common law, but also on patent
law to find that co-owners of a copyright each have equal rights to use their work without the consent of the other. See Carter v. Bailey, 64 Me. 458, 464 (1874) (“Such seems
to be the rule governing owners in common of patent rights; and we think the same
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The differences between the two, however, indicate that analogies to
patent practice and law should be undertaken with great care.
The Federal Circuit has ruled that retroactive licenses granted by
one co-owner cannot cure past patent infringements, noting that only
183
releases can cure prior wrongdoing.
The Federal Circuit relied
upon a century-old case, Lalance & Grosjean Manufacturing Co. v.
Haberman Manufacturing Co., which stated that each co-owner could
pursue or not pursue her own release independently and the settlement of one would not extinguish the claim of the other; to hold otherwise “would be to push the supposed analogy to the law of real
184
property altogether too far.”
Yet for all the similarities between joint ownership of copyrights
and patents, there is one crucial difference that militates against applying the patent rule prohibiting retroactive transfers to our copyright case: patent co-owners do not have any duty to account to one
185
another.
Indeed, a primary reason for the Lalance & Grosjean
court’s holding was that if a joint patent holder elected to settle a
claim or retroactively license the patent, the other joint holder would
be hung out to dry. That is, if one patent co-owner settled without the
knowledge of the other co-owner, the latter would be left with no lawsuit and no legal way to profit from the infringement, a result the
186
Lalance & Grosjean court thought “contrary to natural justice.”
But
the nonlicensing or nonsettling copyright co-owner does not suffer so

principle applicable to the question involved in case of copyright.” (citations omitted)).
183
See Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 345 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(“[T]he grant of a license by one co-owner cannot deprive the other co-owner of the
right to sue for accrued damages for past infringement. That would require a release,
not a license, and the rights of a patent co-owner, absent agreement to the contrary, do
not extend to granting a release that would defeat an action by other co-owners to recover damages for past infringement.”).
184
Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 93 F. 197, 198
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899).
185
See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (“In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of
the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention
. . . without accounting to the other owners.”).
186
Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co. 107 F. 487, 487
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1901). The Lalance & Grosjean court stated that “for one of the complainants without the knowledge of the other to settle with the defendants for $20,000
and refuse to give the other complainant a dollar seems . . . ‘contrary to natural justice.’” Id. (quoting In re Horsley & Knighton’s Patent, L.R. 8 Eq. 475, 477 (M.R.
1869)).
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unjustly where the law provides her with the right to an accounting.
Any analogy to patent law must therefore account for the absence of
such protection for patent co-owners.
IV. UNILATERAL RETROACTIVE TRANSFERS CANNOT
CURE PRIOR INFRINGEMENTS
Ignited by the Second Circuit’s decision in Davis, many have argued either that the court should revisit its ruling that retroactive licensing by one co-owner does not immunize infringers from infringement actions brought by the other co-owners, or that other
courts should shy away from this rule. While these responses are motivated, at least in part, by the desire for those in the entertainment
industry to continue the ongoing industry practice of using retroactive
transfers, there are also strong legal, logical, and policy arguments in
favor of this practice, as discussed in this section. Yet these responses
can only take the argument so far before it must fail in light of all
relevant considerations.
A. Reasons for Allowing Unilateral Retroactive
Transfers to Cure Prior Infringements
Particularly with the introduction of divisibility into the Copyright
188
Act in 1976, Congress has recognized that giving copyright owners
increased autonomy is an important mechanism for promoting the
exchange and dissemination of copyrighted works. Since then, courts
have often endorsed the increased dissemination of copyrighted
works. Courts have responded, for example, by excusing infringement in cases where, due to market barriers, externalities, or antidis189
semination motives, a copyrighted work was not reaching the public
187

See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing a
coowner’s obligation to account); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (“[E]ach coowner ha[s] an independent right to use or
license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners for any
profits.”); 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 6.12[A] (“[T]he prevailing rule is that
a joint owner is under a duty to account to the other joint owners of the work for a ratable share of the profits realized from his use of the work.”). It is not clear, however,
whether this duty to account, which is now universally accepted, arises out of state or
federal law. See generally Craig Y. Allison, Note, Does A Copyright Coowner’s Duty To Account Arise Under Federal Law?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1998, 2012-33 (1992) (arguing that the
accounting duty is a federal rule).
188
See supra notes 159-163 and accompanying text (describing divisibility).
189
See Gordon, supra note 157, at 1627-35 (discussing the interplay of market failures and fair use).
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and, therefore, not fulfilling the primary goal of increasing the public
190
welfare.
The broad precedent that a case like Davis sets, however, seems to
take a step in the opposite direction. By limiting a co-owner’s ability
to make a retroactive conveyance, the court seems to encroach upon
the right of co-owners to alienate their property and to do so however
and to whomever they wish. This is effectively the right that the Copyright Act itself gives to them when it states that “[t]he ownership of a
191
copyright may be transferred . . . by any means of conveyance.”
Existing copyright law could be sufficient to resolve this issue: a
retroactive transfer is “any means of conveyance,” and one used quite
commonly at that. If a retroactive transfer is a means of conveyance,
then there is no need to resort to either principles of tenancy in common or contract law. This reasoning could explain why the courts in
many of the cases cited in Part III.A did not enter into a protracted
discussion of the retroactive transfer issue: if copyright law itself provides the necessary legal structure for the transaction, while fulfilling
copyright law’s goals of public dissemination and rewarding the author, then no further discussion is necessary.
Any concern that retroactive transfers would yield unfair exploitation of the work at the expense of the other co-owner could be mitigated by copyright law’s protection of co-owners through the duty to
192
account.
Thus, a co-owner who grants a retroactive license or
reaches a settlement with the infringer does not reap all the profits
from such conveyances herself: she must split them with her coowners in proportion to their ownership. This accounting, one may
argue, can compensate a co-owner for her contribution just as copyright protection intends. Furthermore, this accounting and compen-

190

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(“[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited
monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public
appropriate access to their work product.”).
191
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
192
See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the obligation to account); cf. GEORGE D. CARY, STUDY NO. 13: JOINT OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHTS (1958),
reprinted in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW 12-17,
at 33-34 (1959) (“The relatively recent development of the accounting principle provided a brake upon the unbridled ambition of a co-owner who might be inclined to
disregard the rights of his colleagues and at the same time served a useful purpose in
permitting an energetic co-owner the right to profit from his original labor . . .
whether or not his other co-owners joined with him.”).
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193

sation, which is not present in the patent context, makes up for the
194
fact that the co-owner can no longer sue for infringement.
Another goal of copyright litigation would also be furthered
through the duty to account: even when infringement has taken place
and litigation has been initiated, courts may still wish to encourage
settlements, understanding that parties can often value the exploita195
tion themselves.
If a single co-owner could retroactively authorize
the prior infringement instead of requiring each individual co-owner
to come forward, the litigation would certainly be prone to quicker
settlement.
196
Additional concerns of the potential for “legal mischief” —such
that one co-owner could end ongoing litigation that another co-owner
has brought—can be allayed, at least in part, by comparison to prospective licensing. The right of one co-owner to grant a prospective
license to a third party, even when another co-owner does not wish to
do so, is an undisputed right of joint ownership. It has been part and
parcel of our joint-ownership jurisprudence since well before the
197
modern copyright statute. Perhaps it is just too bad that the nonsettling co-owner’s infringement suit must fail, as the settling co-owner
was merely acting on a right incident to copyright ownership. This
notion builds on a point raised by the Venegas-Hernandez court: “The
granting of a retroactive license implies that the retroactive licensor
had the requisite ownership and, therefore, authority to make such a

193

See supra Part III.D.
Cf. Copyright.net Music Publ’g LLC v. MP3.com, No. 01-7321, 2003 WL
740757, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2003) (“[W]hile the co-owners are precluded from
suing MP3.com, they may proceed in an accounting action against the settling HFAReleasors.”). There are other theories examining the basis for the accounting rule. See
Vern G. Davidson, Comment, Entertainment Law: Problems in Co-Ownership of Copyrights,
8 UCLA L. REV. 1035, 1044 (citing precedent for at least four theories on which to base
the duty to account).
195
See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997 (2d Cir.
1983) (“As a general matter, we note first that courts favor the policy of encouraging
voluntary settlement of disputes.”). Of course, courts have their own additional motives for encouraging settlements in all litigation.
196
Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 102, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117
(2008).
197
See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569, 570
(2d Cir. 1955) (describing the assignment of rights to publish a jointly owned song),
modified on other grounds, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955); Meredith v. Smith, 145 F.2d 620,
621 (9th Cir. 1944) (“It is not questioned that . . . [a] co-owner of the copyright would
have had the right to give permission . . . to publish the book.”); see also discussion, infra note 201.
194
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198

grant at the time the infringement occurred.”
That is, if the coowner could have authorized the infringement when it occurred—
even over the most strenuous objections of a co-owner—what difference does it make to allow her simply to authorize the infringement
now? The nonsettling co-owner would not be able to sue now, just as
she would not have been able to sue then.
Thus, the problem may exist in the tenet of joint ownership that
allows for unilateral actions but not with retroactive transfers in par199
ticular.
Indeed, the district court in Davis noted that its decision
might seem draconian expressly because “a co-owner has a legal right
to grant a license in a work without another co-owner’s permission or
200
to transfer his rights in the copyright freely.”
While it may be compelling to suggest an alternative to the practice of unilateral action, it
would clearly run contrary to U.S. copyright law and likely stifle public
201
dissemination.
198

Venegas-Hernandez v. Peer, Nos. 01-1215, 2004 WL 3686337, at *33 (D.P.R.
May 19, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Venegas-Hernández v. Asociación De Compositores y Editores de Música Latinoamericana (ACEMLA), 424 F.3d
50 (1st Cir. 2005).
199
Cf. supra text accompanying notes 34-37 (discussing the tension between exclusivity of copyrights and joint ownership).
200
Davis v. Blige, 419 F. Supp. 2d 493, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d on other grounds,
505 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 (2008).
201
The negative effects of permitting unilateral actions by joint owners were well
known leading up to the 1976 Copyright Act. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 221
F.2d at 570 (describing a situation where two coowners attempted to separately license
their work to the same third party at different fees); CARY, supra note 192, at 33-34
(“One defect in this approach . . . is that it permits co-owners to compete against each
other, with the normal result that both may suffer financially.”). Bars on unilateral actions by joint owners are, in fact, popular in Europe. The English rule developed such
that all coowners of a work had to consent before the work could be exploited. See
Cescinsky v. George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., (1916) 2 K.B. 325, 330 (“[A] reproduction without the consent of all the owners is an infringement . . . .”); Powell v. Head,
(1879) 12 Ch. D. 686, 687 (granting an injunction and damages to nonconsenting
coowners); CARY, supra note 192, at 33. This is also the rule in France, the Republic of
Korea, Austria, Italy, and Sweden. See CARY, supra note 192, at 23; JULIE E. COHEN ET
AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 134 (2002). Congress considered the merits of switching to the English system in the course of revising copyright
law prior to enacting the 1976 Act; when various copyright experts were asked for their
advice, only one (Professor Melville Nimmer) favored following the English system. See
Letter from Melville B. Nimmer to the U.S. Copyright Office (Sept. 15, 1958), in COMMENTS AND VIEWS SUBMITTED TO THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE ON JOINT OWNERSHIP OF
COPYRIGHTS (1958), reprinted in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL REVISION OF THE
COPYRIGHT LAW 12-17, at 5 (1959) (“I would rather adopt the unitary standard suggested whereby the consent of all co-owners is required for use or license of the
work.”). Some have argued that since global copyright licensing often requires the
approval of all joint authors before a work can be exploited, adopting this system
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B. The Necessary Solution: Unilateral Retroactive Transfers
Cannot Cure Prior Infringements
The foregoing arguments are compelling, but their deficiencies
indicate that, on balance, the simplistic interpretation of copyright
practice and law alone is insufficient to actually further the goals of
copyright law. For the following reasons, courts should not permit
unilateral retroactive conveyances to cure prior infringement.
First, and most importantly, in the problem at hand the infringer’s use of the work was unequivocally unauthorized at the time
of exploitation. Any attempt to “cure” that infringement must recognize that the nonlicensing or nonsettling co-owners’ infringement
claim already accrued. While the Copyright Act is silent as to when
202
exactly a claim accrues, courts have held that infringement claims
accrue either on the date of the infringement (the injury rule) or on
the date the infringement is discovered by the copyright holder (the
203
discovery rule).
Under either accrual determination method, however, the result is the same: the injury occurs on the date of the third
party’s unauthorized exploitation, that is, when the copyright holder’s
exclusive right was violated. Since, in our situation, the copyright
holder’s exclusive right was violated, she has a cause of action for
copyright infringement, itself a vested right belonging to a copyright
204
holder.
While the Copyright Act does allow a copyright co-owner to use
her jointly owned work in any way authorized by the Act unilaterally, it
does not provide a way for one copyright co-owner to divest another
co-owner of vested rights. Reference to basic property and contract
205
law principles can fill this void, as Congress intended, and indicate
that a settlement or retroactive transfer by one co-owner should not

would better align U.S. copyright practice with the current practical realities of global
copyright licensing. See Self, supra note 10, at 75.
202
See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2006) (stating only that “[n]o civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after
the claim accrued,” but not specifying when accrual occurs).
203
See Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 235, 242-48
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (acknowledging that courts are split as to whether accrual of copyright
infringement claims follows the injury or discovery rule and concluding that, based on
the legislative history of the Copyright Act, the injury rule is proper).
204
See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)
(finding that an accrued right to sue for infringement belongs to the copyright
holder).
205
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5736.
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bind other co-owners and divest them of their accrued rights under
the Copyright Act.
In addition, incorporation of these principles allows the goals of
206
copyright predictability to be fulfilled.
It also makes it easy to avoid
the problem encountered by the Venegas-Hernandez court, which is
likely to be encountered in the future. The Venegas-Hernandez court,
as mentioned above, found that a party, believing it was a co-owner of
a copyright, could be held liable for contributory infringement (i.e.,
inducing a 1993 infringement) for issuing a retroactive license to an
207
infringing party in 1998.
While the First Circuit pointed out the
208
complications of such a holding, contributory infringement claims
209
are alleged with increasing frequency in copyright lawsuits.
The extreme factual uncertainty as to whether a particular act was or was not
authorized and the ability to revise past facts will only make such para-

206

See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989)
(“Congress’ paramount goal in revising the 1976 Act . . . [was] enhancing predictability and certainty of copyright ownership.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5745)); see also Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 104-05 (2d
Cir. 2007) (listing “the need for predictability and certainty” as one “strong reason[]
for disfavoring” retroactive licenses), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 117 (2008).
207
Venegas-Hernandez v. Peer, Nos. 01-1215, 2004 WL 3686337, at *33-34 (D.P.R.
May 19, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Venegas-Hernández v. Asociación De Compositores y Editores de Música Latinoamericana (ACEMLA), 424 F. 3d
50 (1st Cir. 2005).
208
See Venegas-Hernández v. Asociación De Compositores y Editores de Música
Latinoamericana (ACEMLA), 424 F.3d 50, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[O]bviously a license
in 1998 did not ‘cause’ a 1993 infringement.”).
209
See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 918-19 (2005) (addressing a contributory-infringement claim based upon peer-to-peer file-sharing program); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-35 (1984)
(recognizing a cause of action for contributory infringement).
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210

doxical complications like Venegas-Hernandez all the more likely and
211
allow for absurd claims.
Second, while a nonsettling or nonlicensing co-owner would not
be left with no profit, the accounting remedy would be inadequate
compensation for an accrued infringement claim. Indeed, the nonsettling or nonlicensing co-owner may have to initiate suit against the
settling co-owner and prove the latter’s profits to receive her share of
those profits. Those profits, however, are the licensing co-owner’s
profits from licensing, not the infringer’s profits from infringing the
copyright. A copyright holder whose copyright has been infringed is
212
also entitled to the infringer’s profits, but she could not receive
them in any accounting proceeding, nor could she receive any damages she suffered as a result of the infringement, to which she is also
213
entitled.

210

For a case that proposed a similar complication and could have posed serious
problems if past ownership were a malleable fact, see Vasquez v. Torres-Negron, No.
06-619, 2007 WL 2244784, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2007), in which the defendant (who
earlier had made an allegedly unauthorized derivative of plaintiffs’ work) allegedly infringed plaintiffs’ copyright by copyrighting his allegedly derivative work and suing—
and eventually settling with—others for infringing his copyright. The plaintiffs claimed
that the defendant’s settlements constituted a form of indirect copyright infringement
in that they contributed to or made the defendant vicariously liable for further infringement upon the plaintiffs’ original work. Id. at *11. The court noted that
“[c]ontrary to plaintiffs’ creative but incorrect contention, Torres could neither have
exercised any control over the unauthorized publication of Noche de Fiesta by virtue of
the settlements nor induced any unauthorized actions by the record companies.” Id. at *12.
211
See, e.g., Davis, 505 F.3d at 106 n.14 (“[I]nfringers who obtained a retroactive
transfer of a copyright interest could not only grant retroactive licenses but also sue
other past infringers of the copyright. These retroactive co-owners could then issue retroactive licenses to these other past infringers, thwarting yet other potential infringement suits by a non-licensing co-owner.”); see also Self, supra note 10, at 74 (noting the
problematic result that retroactive licensees could be placed “on footing equal to or
even greater than that of law-abiding licensees”). In addition, predictability may also
be sacrificed when, as is not uncommon, the (co)ownership of a copyright is contested. See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1991) (considering
whether a contributor to a work ought to be considered a coowner of the work). If
retroactive transfers were given curative power in such a situation, a coowner pursuing
an infringement action may believe that she alone owns the copyright, only to have her
claim disappear when the infringer is able to discover a contributor or other person
who can now claim co-ownership and then settle with that newly discovered co-owner.
See, e.g., supra Part II.A.4 (discussing Silberstein v. Fox Entm’t Group, Inc., 424 F. Supp.
2d 616, 620-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
212
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006) (“The copyright owner is entitled to recover . . . any
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement . . . .”).
213
Id. (“The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by
him or her as a result of the infringement . . . .”).

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

918

[Vol. 157: 881

As the Davis court failed to note, however, a co-owner’s share of
the licensing co-owner’s profits, while probably not as great as the infringer’s actual profits from the infringing use, may be the approximate amount to which she would be entitled had a co-owner originally
licensed the work before the infringer exploited it. That is, if the licensing co-owner had actually given a prospective license to a third
party (thereby authorizing the use in advance), the nonlicensing coowner would still only be entitled to her share of the licensing fee, not
the third-party user’s profits.
Yet, in the context of a pending infringement suit, the retroactive
license or settlement costs would not be identical to a license in the
prospective licensing context. While prospective licensing fees are
typically bargained for with a view towards the rates of similar li214
censes, settlements are bargained for against a backdrop of unknown damages that a judge or jury may award, as well as the costs of
215
In addition, should the copyrighted work be
continued litigation.
unique, prospective licensors could bargain for a very favorable licensing agreement, knowing that any licensee could not acquire an ade216
quate substitute.
This upper hand would be lost in the settlement
or retroactive licensing context, where the infringement has already
taken place and the copyright holders can form only a retroactive license against a backdrop of uncertain and discretionary damage
217
awards.
An accounting would be even more insufficient if the actual damages to the copyright holders were insignificant. Since a retroactive
license would foreclose the litigation option for the nonlicensing coowner (and limit her to an accounting), she could not opt to receive
statutory damages in lieu of actual damages and profits, which, under
the discretion of the district court, could range from $200 to $150,000

214

See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 554, 1406-17 (2d ed.
1996) (discussing factors affecting license fees and listing typical licensing fees).
215
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504–505 (allowing remedies for actual damages, profits, statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and potential double penalties); Self, supra note 10, at 74
(characterizing the uncertainty as “enormous” given variability in damages and “notoriously broad” judicial discretion).
216
See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 214, at 554-57 (discussing factors that affect the
value of a song); Self, supra note 10, at 74 (analyzing factors affecting copyright settlement negotiations). This could cause significant conflict among co-owners over
whether to settle or continue litigating in the hope that the damages awarded would
be high. A retroactive transfer would effectively allow one dissenting co-owner to decide for the rest of her co-owners.
217
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (providing a range for statutory damage awards).
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218

per infringement.
The same could be said when the licensing coowner settles the claim or grants a retroactive license for a paltry sum;
again, the nonlicensing co-owner would be forced to settle for her
share of that sum rather than suing for potentially more substantial
statutory damages. The co-owner’s right to elect statutory damages
vests when the infringement claim accrues; permitting retroactive
transfers to abrogate this vested right on the notion that an accounting would suffice neglects these considerations.
Third, giving curative power to retroactive licenses would likely
encourage, rather than discourage, infringement—a clear antithesis
to Copyright Act’s goal of exclusive-rights protection. Infringement
would be encouraged primarily because an infringer—faced with the
threat of high statutory damages in an infringement suit—has the option to pay her way out of the suit by obtaining a retroactive license
from only one co-owner, perhaps one that is not even a party to the
action and willing to settle for less than the suing co-owner would
219
be.
To be sure, the settling (or license-granting) co-owner could
hold out for a higher settlement (or licensing fee), if she is even aware
that she is settling on behalf of all co-owners. And while there may
not always be a co-owner willing to settle or grant a retroactive license
at a bargain to the infringer, the infringer will at worst face the same
threat of court-awarded damages. Allowing unilateral retroactive licenses, however, allows for the infringer to find a cheaper way to in220
fringe that otherwise would not exist.
Such incentives, moreover, would specifically encourage willful in221
fringement, for which the Copyright Act evinces a strong aversion.
If a potential infringer believes that it should not matter whether she
receives authorization before or after she exploits a jointly owned
copyrighted work, she would be more likely to proceed with authorization than if it were not possible to receive retroactive authorization.
There is no guarantee that she would be able to receive authorization.
Under the Davis rule, however, potential infringers are faced with the
218

Id.
See Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 106 n.14 (noting that retroactive transfers could
thwart infringement suits).
220
Of course, that cheaper option would be available ex ante in the form of an
ordinary prospective license from a coowner who grants a license at a low fee. Such a
situation, however, is not discouraged by the Copyright Act, but expressly encouraged.
17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
221
See supra text accompanying notes 154-156 (noting that the Copyright Act punishes willful infringement with harsher penalties than it does with nonwillful infringement).
219
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threat of continued litigation and penalties for infringement on the
one hand, or settling with each and every co-owner of the copyrighted
work on the other. Neither choice is appealing, and the latter is especially unattractive—probably so unattractive that any potential infringer would likely make every effort to obtain a license before using
the work.
Furthermore, the circumstances of retroactive licenses are not
necessarily such that the market has failed and the work, but for a ret222
roactive license, would not reach the public.
Since, after all, one of
the co-owners was willing to license the work retroactively instead of
litigating to judgment, it is unlikely that each of the co-owners was
unwilling to license the work ex ante. Thus, the threat of market failure is not so strong as to warrant excusing past infringements (or regarding them as cured) in order to increase public dissemination.
This solution, since it still permits a co-owner to grant a license prospectively without the consent of her co-owners, should not have the
223
effect of stifling dissemination of works; rather, it should promote
the timely acquisition of licenses.
Accordingly, allowing one joint owner to settle or retroactively license a copyrighted work so as to extinguish a co-owner’s right to sue
for infringement would not further the goals of the Copyright Act.
Instead, such curative retroactive licenses appear to make infringement less costly, thus promoting the unauthorized exploitation of
copyrighted works.
CONCLUSION
The rights incident to joint ownership of copyright certainly do
not fit comfortably with the notion of the exclusivity of these rights.

222

See supra text accompanying notes 157-158 & 188 (explaining how copyright
law provides the incentive to disseminate works).
223
Cf. Letter from Edward A. Sargoy to the Copyright Office, (Oct. 24, 1958), in
COMMENTS AND VIEWS SUBMITTED TO THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE ON JOINT OWNERSHIP OF
COPYRIGHTS, supra note 201, at 10, reprinted in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW 12-17 (1959) (asserting that “the bringing of works to
public attention and enjoyment would . . . be stifled” if joint owners could not license
the work without the consent of their coowners). There is an argument that this solution may have the opposite effect and stifle public dissemination of works. While there
may be such an incremental effect, the only basis for this argument is that “a little infringement is a good thing.” Courts, however, are largely unwilling to endorse such a
view in the absence of a market failure. See Gordon, supra note 157, at 1627-33 (noting
that courts are more likely to find fair use than infringement where market bargains
are unavailable).

2009]

Unilateral Settlements and Retroactive Transfers

921

Since each co-owner has the ability to exploit or to authorize an exploitation of a copyrighted work without the consent of her co-owners,
there will be circumstances where one co-owner acts against the wishes
of her co-owners. For the most part, copyright law protects unwilling
co-owners, particularly through the duty to account.
The legal fiction of a retroactive transfer of authorization serves
only the purpose of cutting short a lawsuit for infringement that has
already been committed and that a nonauthorizing co-owner has a
right to prosecute. The accounting remedy proves insufficient in such
a situation—the Copyright Act entitles a co-owner to more, in the
hopes of preventing infringement and encouraging the development
and dissemination of creative works. The Copyright Act references
the laws of tenancy in common and contract law, and recourse to
these areas of law can illuminate much about the rights and duties
that co-owners owe each other. Both of these areas of law, as well as
the underlying goals of the Copyright Act, support the conclusion that
retroactive transfers should not be able to cure prior infringement.
The traditional ability of a copyright owner to license a work however she pleases may make this tough to swallow for some in the entertainment industry, where joint ownership is a common companion to
the creation of works. Yet since the vested copyrights of a co-owner
would be eliminated and the goals of the Copyright Act compromised,
unilateral retroactive transfers should not be allowed to cure prior
infringing acts.

